How do hospitals respond to cross price incentives inherent in diagnosis-related groups systems? The importance of substitution in the market for sepsis conditions
How do hospitals respond to cross price incentives inherent in diagnosis-related groups systems? The importance of substitution in the market for sepsis conditions (Wiley).
This study addresses the question of how hospitals respond to the cross price incentives inherent in reimbursements based on diagnosis‐related groups (DRG). Unique market‐wide administrative data allow to exploit a natural experiment in Germany in which the relative attractiveness of greatly divergent
reimbursements for clinically similar patients changes in the market for sepsis conditions on January 1, 2010. This natural experiment
provides-unintentionally-extra reimbursements in cases in which hospitals
reorganize transfers for deceasing patients to other facilities, alter the time
of death, the choice of the condition being chiefly responsible for the
hospital admission (primary diagnosis), or the intensity of mechanical
ventilation.
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Quelle: Wiley, 03.01.2021
