Hospital reimbursement and capacity constraints: Evidence from orthopedic surgeries myDRG Stellenmarkt Gesundheitswesen

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Hospital reimbursement and capacity constraints: Evidence from orthopedic surgeries

Hospital reimbursement and capacity constraints: Evidence from orthopedic surgeries (Science Direct).

Highlights: Provider payment incentives may affect fiscal spending and patient health. I study effects of large price changes for hospitals in Norway. I focus on patients referred for orthopedic surgeries....

Health care providers response to payment incentives may have consequences for both fiscal spending and patient health. This paper studies the effects of a change in the payment scheme for hospitals in Norway. In 2010, payments for patients discharged on the day of admission were substantially decreased, while payments for stays lasting longer than one day were increased. This gave
hospitals incentives to shift patients from one-day stays to two-day stays, or
to decrease the admission of one-day stays.
[...]

Results imply that the current payment policy yields little scope for policymakers to affect the
health care spending and treatment choices.


Quelle: Science Direct, 24.02.2021

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erschienen am Montag, 08.03.2021